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Abandoning Bankruptcy Law's "Identity of Interest" 
Exception 
He said true things, but called them by wrong names. 
Robert Browning, Bishop B/ougram's Apology 
When a corporation files a petition for bankruptcy relief, the 
bankruptcy court will scrutinize any transfers it made immediately 
before the commencement of the case. In particular, the court will 
often avoid a fraudulent transfer, 1 such as a transfer for which the 
debtor corporation did not receive "reasonably equivalent value."2 
I. The most comprehensive scholarly discussion of fraudulent conveyance law is found in 
Clark, The .Duties of the Corporate .Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1977). 
2. Two provisions of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § IOI, 92 Stat. 
2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ IOl-1532b (West 1979)) [hereinafter cited as "new Act"], con-
cern fraudulent transfers. § 548 provides: 
Fraudulent transfers and obligations 
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer ofan interest of the debtor in property, or any 
obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year before 
the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor -
(I) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, de-
lay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that 
such transfer occurred or such obligation was incurred, indebted; 
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer 
or obligation; and 
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation 
was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation; 
(ii) was engaged in business, or was about to engage in business or a 
transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably 
small capita~ or 
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that 
would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured. 
(b) The trustee of a partnership debtor may avoid any transfer of an interest of the 
debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on 
or within one year before the date of the filing of the petition, to a general partner in the 
debtor, if the debtor was insolvent on the date such transfer was made or such obligation 
was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation. 
(c) Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voidable under this section is 
voidable under section 544, 545, or 547 of this title, a transferee or obligee of such a 
transfer or obligation that takes for value and in good faith has a lien on any interest 
transferred, may retain any lien transferred, or may enforce any obligation incurred, as 
the case may be, to the extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in 
exchange for such transfer or obligation. 
(d)(I) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is made when such transfer becomes 
so far perfected that a bona fide purchaser from the debtor against whom such transfer 
could have been perfected cannot acquire an interest in the property transferred that is 
superior to the interest in such property of the transferee, but if such transfer is not so 
perfected before the co=encement of the case, such transfer occurs immediately before 
the date of the filing of the petition. 
(2) In this section -
(A) ''value" means property, or satisfaction or securing a present or antecedent 
debt of the debtor, but does not include an unperformed promise to furnish support to 
the debtor or to a relative of the debtor; and 
(B) a co=odity broker or forward contract merchant that receives a margin 
payment, as de.fined in section 761(15) of this title, takes for value. 
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This scrutiny protects the bankrupt's creditors from some injurious 
forms of fraud. Yet certain affiliated3 corporations can avoid the 
laws against fraudulent transfer through a judicial transfer that this 
Note will call the "identity of interest" exception. 
The exception for affiliated corporations sharing an identity of 
interest is a flawed concept that should be discarded. Although the 
exception sometimes leads to equitable results, its standards are so 
vague that it more frequently hinders justice. Courts often invoke it 
inappropriately but ignore it when its flexibility would be useful. 
More fundamentally, the exception treats bankrupt affiliates errati-
cally, viewing them sometimes as one unit, at other times as distinct 
entities. Courts could more sensibly approach the problem by estab-
lishing standards for determining whether affiliates should be treated 
as separate companies or as a single unit. In fact, courts already 
have proven legal tools to do this in "novation" and "consolidation"; 
consistent, principled use of those doctrines would permit courts to 
abandon altogether the complicated and unjust identity of interest 
exception. 
Section r of this Note discusses the goals and weaknesses of the 
identity of interest exception; Section II explains the advantages of 
consolidation and novation; and the final Section suggests a way to 
separate cases where novation is appropriate from those where con-
solidation is the preferred remedy. 
I. GOALS AND FAILINGS OF THE EXCEPTION 
The goal of the identity of interest exception is laudable. Not all 
transfers without monetary consideration are fraudulent; many 
transfers between affiliated corporations are made without monetary 
consideration for good business reasons.4 For example, when a do-
ll U.S.C.A § 548 (West 1979). 
§ 544(b) provides: 
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any 
obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor hold-
ing an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or that is now 
allowable only under section 502(3) of this title. 
These provisions replace the similar provisions in the "old Act." Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 
ch. 575, 52 Stat. 883. The old Act's § 67d required "fair consideration" rather than "reason-
ably equivalent value." The new language streamlines the old because "fair consideration" 
has frequently been defined in terms of"reasonably equivalent value." 4 W. COLLIER, BANK· 
RUPTCY 15-19 (14th ed. 1978). 
3. The new Act defines "affiliate" for the first time. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(2) (West 1979). The 
Act finds affiliation when one entity has 20% ownership or control of another and controls 
substantially all the other firm's business. 
4. In part, the possibility that distinct corporations could share co=on interests reflects 
modem business organization, which does not always encompass an entire enterprise. Accord-
ing to Professor Landers: 
The owners of a business enterprise often choose to conduct their operations in the form 
of two or more separate corporations rather than as a single corporate entity. They may 
do so for a variety of reasons: to separate functions for administrative ease, to control 
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nee is on the verge of bankruptcy, the donor corporation may enjoy 
substantial benefits from merely postponing its affiliate's liquida-
tion.5 Or a fully solvent corporation may have a temporary cash 
fl.ow problem, prompting the affiliated donor to offer aid to prevent 
disruptions in its market.6 Even-more commonly, two affiliates with 
identical management may toss assets back and forth carelessly, but 
without the intent usually required for fraud.7 Courts have thus cre-
ated an exception for affiliates that have an "identity of interest," 
presuming that such a close relationship ensures that business rea-
sons really prompted the transfer. 
But identity of interest is only poorly defined, and poor definition 
leads to unjust application. The unjustness of the identity of interest 
exception appears in three ways. First, the vagueness of the standard 
hinders planning by debtors. Second, the exception places unfair 
burdens on creditors, often forcing them to take inequitable and un-
foreseeable losses. Finally, the exception breaks up the unity of the 
fraudulent transfers doctrine. While these drawbacks might be ac-
C(?ptable if no alternative existed, they are hard to defend when the 
same benefits can be achieved without them. 
Courts have not applied the identity of interest exception consis-
tently. One court, for example, has applied the exception when a 
parent corporati_on paid one debt of a subsidiary that otherwise 
maintained its affairs separately.8 But another court refused to apply 
it when two affiliates in the same business, both owned by the same 
individual, made several payments on behalf of each other.9 A few 
intrepid judges have suggested imprecise standards like "overall pat-
tern of operations that had existed over time" 10 but these are no 
more illuminating than the phrase "identity of interest." Neither 
many businesses with a minimal capital investment, to comply with various legal require-
ments, to minimize liability or to insulate certain assets for other activities, and, probably 
most important, to avoid the predations of the ubiquitous tax collector. 
Landers, A Un!fted Approach to Parent, Subsidiary and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 589 (1975). 
5. See, e.g., Samuels v. Charles E. Fogg Co., 258 Mass. 402, 155 N.E. 429 (1927); Nelson v. 
Poss, 172 Minn. 149,214 N.W. 787 (1927); Ulicsnick v. Dalrymple, 102 N.J. Eq. 136, 140 A. 19 
(1928), qffd., 103 N.J. Eq. 407, 143 A. 920 (1928); Farmers Exchange Bank v. Oneida Motor 
Truck Co., 202 Wis. 266, 232 N.W. 536 (1930); see generally Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 1209 (1953). 
6. See generally Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1959). 
7. See generally McNellis v. Raymond, 287 F. Supp. 232 (N.D.N.Y. 1968), revd. on other 
grounds, 420 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1970). 
8. See Mandel v. Scanlon, 426 F. Supp. 519 (W.D. Pa. 1977). 
9. See Central Natl. Bank v. Coleman (In re B-F Bldg. Corp.), 312 F.2d 691 (6th Cir. 
1963), discussed in note 20 i,!fra. 
10. Hofler v. Marion Lumber Co., 233 F. Supp. 540, 542 (E.D.S.C. 1964). It should be 
noted that after pointing to this irrelevant factor, the court then went on to decide the case on 
the sound ground of novation. 
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debtors nor creditors can plan confidently in such a climate of uncer-
tainty.11 
The identity of interest exception also prevents just repayment of 
creditors. Consider this example: Albatross Associates pays a debt 
of its affiliate Blue Jay Brothers to Seagull Suppliers. Albatross re-
ceives nothing from Blue Jay for its payment, and shortly afterwards 
declares bankruptcy. If a court finds an identity of interest between 
Albatross and Blue Jay, the creditors of Albatross will not be able to 
avoid the payment to Seagull even though Albatross received no tan-
gible value in exchange. On the other hand, Seagull may suffer un-
fairly if the court does not find an identity of interest, for then 
Albatross's creditors can recover the payment, even though Seagull 
thought it was dealing with the solvent affiliate, Blue Jay. In either 
case, Blue Jay retains the supplies delivered by Seagull, who might 
have to sue to recover them. Why involve Seagull in a lawsuit when 
the affiliates' own sloppy practices are to blame? 
Finally, the greatest weakness of the exception for identity of in-
terest is that it allows affiliated corporations sharing common objec-
tives or concerns to escape the laws against fraudulent transfers. 
Thus, the exception shelters sloppy business practices, while failing 
to protect more careful affiliates. Moreover, creditors rely on the 
doctrine prohibiting fraudulent transfers to protect their interests. 
That doctrine forms an important part of bankruptcy law and need-
less exception to it raises needless problems.12 
II. AN ALTERNATIVE FOR BANKRUPT AFFILIATES 
Rather than trying to except a category of affiliates from the laws 
against fraudulent transfer, courts should study the circumstances in 
which a questionable transfer was made. Sometimes the transfer can 
be redefined so that it satisfies the doctrine against fraudulent trans-
fers. In such circumstances, a court can find a novation, exchanging 
the parties to a debt and replacing the bankrupt debtor with its sol-
vent affiliate. When the affairs of two affiliates are so entangled that 
their accounts cannot be separated, courts should consider whether a 
transfer took place at all, or whether the two affiliates should really 
be treated as one corporation. Where appropriate, a court can 
"pierce the corporate veil"13 to make a consolidation. The judg-
11. Indeed, few could afford the internal review necessary to determine identity of interest. 
See Landers, Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates in Bankruptcy, 43 U. CHI, L. 
REV. 527, 540 {1976). 
12. Cf. Clark, supra note I, at 505 ("the law of fraudulent conveyances contains a few 
simple but potent moral principles governing the conduct of debtors toward their creditors"). 
13. "Piercing the corporate veil" has been described as "looking through or beyond the 
corporation to an individual or to another corporation for the purpose of ascertaining the real 
ownership or the real liability." Getman, Vest Pocket Corporations, 2 BROOKLYN L. REV. 45 
(1933). On the other hand, it has also been described as "one of the law's least limpid meta-
phors." Gartner v. Synder, 607 F.2d 582, 586 (2d Cir. 1979) (Lumbard, J.). The balance of 
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ments necessary to find a novation or make a consolidation are not 
new; courts must make the same determinations in a variety of set-
tings.14 These concepts, moreover, can be applied without the tor-
tured search for identity of interest. 
A. Novation 
A novation occurs when the parties to an obligation substitute a 
new obligation between themselves or with a third party.15 A nova-
tion of debtors is the substitution of a new debtor in place of the old. 
The creditor must consent to the release of the old debtor and the 
substitution of the new, but consent may be inferred from a course of 
conduct, such as accepting payment. 16 Thus, the criteria for a nova-
tion are simple and easily recognized.17 Only the substitution is nec-
essary; courts need not inquire into the relationship between the 
parties to the novation. Wholly unaffiliated parties may execute a 
novation. Identity of interest is therefore irrelevant to whether a no-
vation has occurred. 
The concept of novation solves many of the problems posed by 
the identity of interest exception. Consider again the affiliates Alba-
tross and Blue Jay and the creditor Seagull. Albatross pays Blue 
Jay's debt to Seagull and then goes bankrupt. A court could find the 
following novation: Albatross assumed Blue Jay's obligation to pay 
Seagull and Blue Jay assumed a corresponding obligation to repay 
Albatross (thus satisfying the classic "reasonably equivalent value" 
test). The trustee for the creditors of Albatross can collect this ac-
count payable from Blue Jay like any other account payable. 
Seagull is not involved in a lawsuit at all. The court has not had to 
decide if an identity of interest exists, and the doctrine of fraudulent 
transfers stands intact. 
Now, the trustees for the creditors of Albatross may not be satis-
fied when told that the account payable from Blue Jay may be col-
this Note will therefore forsake the metaphor in favor of the more limpid term "consolida-
tion." 
14. See notes 15 & 22 infra. 
15. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 959 (5th ed. 1979). A novation may be effected in one of 
three ways: 1) by the substitution of a new obligation between the same parties to extinguish 
the old; 2) by the substitution of a new debtor in place of the old; or 3) by the substitution of a 
new creditor in place of the old. Courts have used novations since the early nineteenth cen-
tury. See Union Bank v. Stafford, S3 U.S. (12 How.) 327 (1814); John Wanamaker, Inc. v. 
Comfort, 53 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 560 (1932); City Natl. Bank v. 
Fuller, 52 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1931); Wheeler v. Wardell, 173 Va. 168, 3 S.E.2d 377 (1939). 
16. See Oakland County v. Allen, 295 Mich. 61, 294 N.W. 98 (1940); Chicago Blvd. Land 
Co. v. Nutten, 268 Mich. 541, 256 N.W. 541 (1934); Fidelity Ins. Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. 
Shenandoah Valley R.R., 86 Va. 1, 9 S.E. 759 (1889). Unfortunately, the cases have not delin-
eated how explicit a "specific act" must be to be tantamount to an express declaration. See 
City Natl. Bank v. Fuller, 52 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1931); Travis v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 117 
F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1941). 
17. See generally cases collected at 61 A.L.R.2d 755 (1958). 
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lected like any other account payable. Blue Jay may be bankrupt 
itself. 18 Then the trustees would still want to pursue Seagull. Under 
such circumstances, pure novation analysis still gives a fairer result 
than a broad identity of interest exception. The proper inquiry 
should be: At the time of the alleged novation (when Albatross paid 
Seagull), was Blue Jay's promise to repay Albatross "reasonably 
equivalent value"? If so, then the novation should be upheld as non-
fraudulent despite Blue Jay's subsequent misfortune, and Seagull 
should remain immune from attack. If, on the other hand, Blue Jay 
was insolvent when Albatross paid Seagull, then its promissory note 
was of questionable worth - less than reasonably equivalent 
value - and Albatross's payment to Seagull should be avoided. 
Once more, the presence or absence of an identity of interest be-
tween Albatross and Blue Jay is irrelevant. 
The cases most often cited as establishing the identity of interest 
exception have recognized the value of a novation analysis. Indeed, 
the most frequently cited case actually looked for a novation without 
ever referring to identity of interest. 19 Some courts, however, look-
ing at the close relationship involved, used the term "identity of in-
terest" to buttress their novation analysis,20 and others lapsed into 
making it a flawed independent standard.21 By doing away with the 
18. The insolvency of the party accepting the others' debt does not affect the status of the 
novation. See Riber v. Morris, 279 Mich. 344,272 N.W. 700 (1937). 
19. Barr & Creelman Mill & Plumbing Supply Co. v. Zoller, 109 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1940). 
See text at notes 28-29 infra. 
20. See, e.g., Hofler v. Marion Lumber Co., 233 F. Supp. 540, 542 (E.D.S.C. 1964), which 
unnecessarily emphasized the overall pattern of operations of the affiliates over time; Mandel 
v. Scanlon, 426 F. Supp. 519, 524 (W.D. Pa. 1977), which also overemphasized a "history of 
business dealings" between a parent corporation and its subsidiary. 
See also Central Natl. Bank v. Coleman (In re B-F Bldg. Corp.), 312 F.2d 691 (6th Cir. 
1963). In B-F Bldg. Corp., Baird was president and controlling shareholder of two firms, B-F 
Building Corp. and Baird-Foerst Corp. Baird-Foerst borrowed $10,000 from the bank in ex-
change for an unsecured note. Baird-Foerst then gave the funds to B-F, receiving no consider-
ation in return. Later, when both B-F and Baird-Foerst were on the verge of bankruptcy, B-F 
gave the bank a promissory note for $10,000, secured by its land. In return, the bank relin-
quished Baird-Foerst's earlier promissory note. The court upheld the contention of the credi-
tors' trustee that the last-minute substitution of a fully secured note for an "unsecured and 
probably worthless" note was a fraudulent transfer. That assessment was probably accurate, 
but one is left to wonder what could possibly present a more compelling case for "identity of 
interest." More precisely, one should wonder whether the case offered an appropriate setting 
for a consolidation. See text at notes 22-24 infra. 
21. In Klein v. Tabatchnick, 418 F. Supp, 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), Tabatchnick and Emmer 
were the principal shareholders in JNT, a small brokerage firm. Using securities furnished by 
Joseph Taub as collateral, Tabatchnick borrowed $50,000 from a bank. In tum, Tabatchnick 
lent the $50,000 to JNT for its operations. When Taub asked for his securities back, Emmer 
offered some of his own securities as replacement collateral. In return, Tabatchnick gave Em-
mer certain JNT securities. When JNT went bankrupt, the trustees for JNT's creditors argued 
that the delivery of JNT securities to Emmer was a fraudulent transfer. The court searched for. 
an identity of interest and found none, since "[t]here is no evidence of any comingling of 
Tabatchnick's and JNT's assets or business affairs, or of the existence of common debts ..•• 
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exception and looking instead at the parties' true understanding of 
the transaction, courts can avoid repeating these unjust results. 
B. Consolidations 
Novation can often explain inter-affiliate transfers that would 
otherwise complicate bankruptcy proceedings. But novation can 
only account for simple transfers; where affiliates had many deal-
ings, novation is inadequate to untangle them. In such tangled situa-
tions, courts still need not resort to searching for identity of interest; 
they can consolidate the accounts of the affiliates. Consolidation al-
lows the court to treat the affiliates in law as they are already treating 
themselves in fact: as one entity. It provides the same advantages 
for debtors and creditors as novation and, like novation, it is well-
established and easily applied.22 Again, although identity of interest 
might be a good reason to consolidate accounts, it is hardly a prereq-
uisite for consolidation. 
Consider once more the case of Albatross and Blue Jay. But now 
assume that they purchase supplies not only from Seagull but also 
from companies Tern, Ugly Duckling, Vulture, and Wren. Neither 
Albatross nor Blue Jay keeps accurate records and they rarely know 
which company has ordered or received which supplies. Each pays 
for supplies out of cash on hand, regardless-of who ordered them, 
and it is impossible to tell who paid for what. When Albatross goes 
bankrupt, its creditors want to recover the payments made on behalf 
of Blue Jay for which Albatross received no value. Neither identity 
of interest nor novation will treat this situation correctly: the fairest 
Nor is there any indication that JNT had some obligation to fulfill with respect to the arrange-
ment between Tabatchnick and Emmer." 418 F. Supp. at 1372-73. 
Apparently, the court did not see that Tabatchnick was acting purely as JNT's intermedi-
ary in his borrowing. Novation theory would more equitably and accurately have handled the 
situation: JNT furnished securities to Emmer in exchange for Emmer's agreement to give 
Tabatchnick collateral. Since Tabatchnick used that collateral solely for a loan tq JNT, JNT's 
tranfer to Emmer was hardly fraudulent. It was directly in exchange for the continuance of the 
Tabatchnick loan. The court's focus on the term "identity of interest" distracted it from a 
more accurate analysis. 
Similarly, the court in Older v. Winslow (In re Winslow Plumbing, Heating & Con-
tracting), 424 F. Supp. 910 (D. Conn. 1976), sought but did not find an identity of interest. The 
Winslows sold all the stock of a solvent Winslow P.H. & C. to the Nutmeg Co. To sweeten the 
deal, the Winslows agreed to convey some of their land in Vermont to Winslow P.H. & C. 
before they consumated the sale to Nutmeg. Unfortunately, Winslow P.H. & C. went bank-
rupt before Nutmeg finished its payments to the Winslows. The Winslows bought back their 
stock in Winslow P.H. & C. and then transferred the Vermont land back to themselves. The 
trustee for Winslow P.H. & C.'s creditors challenged the retransfer of the land as fraudulent. 
The court found no identity of interest between Winslow P.H. & C. and Nutmeg and therefore 
avoided the transfer. 424 F. Supp. at 915. 
22. See e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 
U.S. 307 (1939); Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966); Soviero 
v. Franklin Natl. Bank, 328 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1964); Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942); Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 
1935). 
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result will come from combining the accounts to the benefit of both 
companies' creditors. Under the identity of interest analysis, courts 
would wrestle to determine for which payments Blue Jay had re-
ceived adequate consideration. Dozens or even hundreds of pay-
ments, often poorly recorded, would complicate this task, and some 
creditors would suffer. If the court could find novations, it could 
protect creditors, but the intermingled accounts might not allow the 
necessary isolation of disputed transfers. 
The court is not helpless, however. It could consolidate the ac-
counts of Albatross and Blue Jay to hold that they should be treated 
as one entity, Federated Flock. Given the affiliates' extensive inter-
mingling, this technique gives the closest possible approximation to 
what actually existed. Such a consolidation will produce one of 
three situations: 
1) Blue Jay's financial strength will pull Albatross out of bank-
ruptcy. If a consolidated Federated Flock would be solvent, then 
Albatross's petition for bankruptcy should be withdrawn, since Al-
batross would never have filed for bankruptcy if it had legally 
merged with a strong Blue Jay. All creditors are fully paid. 
2) A bankrupt Albatross will be consolidated with an also-bank-
rupt Blue Jay. Here, consolidation would merely allow a more equi-
table distribution to the affiliate's creditors. For example, without 
consolidation, Albatross's unsecured creditors might recover 10% of 
their debts while Blue Jay's creditors recovered 70%. If the two firms 
were effectively operating as one, Albatross's and Blue Jay's credi-
tors should receive the same percentage of the amount owed them. 
3) Albatross's bankruptcy will pull a solvent Blue Jay into bank-
ruptcy. Consolidation would have the same effect as if the two firms 
had voluntarily merged before bankruptcy. It might make the credi-
tors of Blue Jay lose some money, but this result is not unfair. Alba-
tross's creditors were actually subsidizing Blue Jay's creditors; and it 
would be more unfair to force one group of creditors to take a 
greater loss when the two affiliates were actually operating as one 
business. In reality, the joint business Federated Flock was bank-
rupt, and all its creditors should be treated equally. 
Some cases dealing with complex transfers between affiliates 
have recognized that consolidation ultimately underlies the identity 
of interest analysis.23 But the term "identity of interest" has assumed 
a life of its own, and courts have followed it to the wrong result.24 
23. See McNellis v. Raymond, 287 F. Supp. 232 (N.D.N.Y. 1968), revd. on other grounds, 
420 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1970), discussed in text at notes 26-27 infra. 
24. In Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1959), Gray was the 
proprietor of W.A. Gray Construction Co. and was also president and sole shareholder of the 
incorporated Twin City Construction Co. Twin City's creditors sued Pioneer Bank & Trust to 
recover three payments from Twin City to the bank. In one, Gray had borrowed $50,000 from 
the bank and deposited it in Twin City's account in exchange for $49,500 worth of Twin City 
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Modern courts should realize that consolidation is the more precise 
and easily applied remedy to regulate bankrupt affiliates and should 
restore it to the center of their analyses. 
III. DISTINGUISHING NOVATION FROM CONSOLIDATION 
Novation and consolidation can solve many of the problems 
posed by the bankruptcy of affiliates while avoiding the difficulties of 
the identity of interest exception. Nevertheless, courts must decide 
which doctrine - novation or consolidation - to apply. This deci-
sion is important: in many cases :finding a novation will be difficult 
or impossible, but if consolidation is used too widely, it will need-
lessly disturb both debtors and creditors. In fact, however, the 
choice is not usually difficult and where the decision is a close one, 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)25 will readily 
point the court in the right direction. 
Usually, courts can easily determine whether the interest trans-
ferred by an affiliate merits simple novation treatment or the more 
extreme medicine of consolidation. In McNel!is v. Raymond,26 for 
example, the court applied the identity of interest exception in cir-
cumstances that cried out for consolidation. Donald Potter had 
brokered real estate through Potter Real Estate Company. His fa-
ther was the 98% owner, president, and treas~rer of Potter Securities 
Corporation and also consulted for the real estate company. The 
Potters operated the two businesses as one unit, drawing the formal 
distinction only for tax and licensing purposes. Thus, Potter Securi-
ties often purchased property for Potter Real Estate without any con-
sideration. Over a four-year period, Isadore Raymond lent Potter 
Securities over $500,000, fully aware of the two firms' integration. 
During that time, Potter Real Estate slowly repaid the allegedly usu-
rious loans. The trustee in bankruptcy for Donald Potter's creditors 
sued to avoid the payments as fraudulent transfers of Potter Real 
Estate funds.27 Clearly, the court did not need to worry about an 
identity of interest in that case. It could have ordered a consolida-
tion of the two firms by virtue of the pervasive intermingling of cor-
porate assets. The words of the Second Circuit in Chemical Bank 
stock. When Gray's venture fell through, he had Twin City repay the bank $50,125. The 
trustee challenged this payment as being without fair consideration. 270 F.2d at 831. The 
court held that there was such a degree of identity and comingling of affairs between Twin 
City and Gray that the corporation and its sole stockholder could not be regarded as separate 
legal entities, insofar as the $50,000 loan was concerned. 270 F.2d at 831. But after noting that 
"there was no proof of actual intent to defraud creditors of Twin City," the court rejected the 
trustee's claim. 270 F.2d at 831. Yet that analysis did not consider the years of intermingling 
between the affiliates; consolidation would have meted out more complete justice. 
25. "Generally Accepted Accounting Principles" are the accounting concepts applied by 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
26. 287 F. Supp. 232 (N.D.N.Y. 1968), revd on other grounds, 420 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1970). 
27. 287 F. Supp. at 238-39. 
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New York Trust Co. v. Khee/28 are instructive: 
The power to consolidate should be used sparingly because of the pos-
sibility of unfair treatment of creditors of a corporate debtor who have 
dealt solely with that debtor without knowledge of its interrelationship 
with others. Yet . . . where the interrelationships of the group are 
hopelessly obscured and the time and expense necessary even to at-
tempt to unscramble them so substantial as to threaten the realization 
of any net assets for all the creditors, equity is not helpless to reach a 
rough approximation of justice to some rather than deny any to all.29 
At the other extreme are cases like Barr & Cree/man Mill & 
Plumbing Supply Co. v. Zo//er.30 Ironically, Barr & Cree/man is fre-
quently cited as establishing the identity of interest exception, even 
though it never employed the term. Dolomite Marine Corporation 
had ordered shipbuilding materials from Barr & Creelman. The 
materials were delivered to Dolomite 3, a wholly owned subsidiary 
of Dolomite Marine, which used the materials to construct a ship 
and issued t~ee checks, totaling $6000, to Barr & Creelman. When 
Dolomite Marine and Dolomite 3 both filed for reorganization, the 
trustee for Dolomite 3's creditors attacked the $6000 payment as 
fraudulent, since it was made to satisfy an obligation that had for-
mally been incurred by Dolomite Marine. The court refrained from 
finding a novation, commenting that "the meager record does not 
afford means of determining whether such a novation actually oc-
curred."31 Yet novation is indeed the proper inquiry in such a case. 
If Dolomite 3 was paying Dolomite Marine's debt in exchange for 
Dolomite Marine's equity in the shipbuilding materials (as was al-
most certainly the case), the single transaction may be analyzed as a 
novation, without resort to either total consolidation or the cumber-
some identity of interest inquiry. 
Cases are not always so conveniently extreme. Some posing the 
problem treated in this Note will fall into a muddy grey area, where 
the affiliates at least arguably maintained separate identities, but also 
allowed their accounts to become substantially intertwined. The 
measure of any legal standard is how accurately and easily it draws a 
line through such a grey area. As we have seen, the identity of inter-
est exception comes up short. Yet a relatively simple standard solves 
the dilemma and permits us to apply with confidence the elegantly 
simple tools of novation and consolidation. At present, bankrupt en-
28. 369 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966). Manuel Kulukundis owned or controlled eight shipping 
lines; he shifted funds back and forth among them in furtherance of his master business plan. 
All went bankrupt at the same time. Since "auditing of the corporations' financial condition 
and especially the inter-company relationships would entail great expenditure of time and 
expense without assurance (of] a fair reflection ... of the debtor corporations," the court 
ordered all assets and liabilities consolidated. 369 F.2d at 846. 
29. 369 F.2d at 847. 
30. 109 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1940). 
31. 109 F.2d at 926. 
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tities, including affiliates, are presumed to be distinct. This presump-
tion should remain undisturbed since novation theory will precisely 
explain most transfers between affiliates. However, if the indepen-
dent auditors appointed by the court find that the application of gen-
erally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) cannot accurately 
disentangle the affiliates' affairs, then the court should order consoli-
dation. 
This standard would give the accountants the burden of deter-
mining whether the affiliates' :finances can be distinguished - appro-
priately so, since they are better able to make such a decision than 
judges. The standard is not expensive, since it requires little more 
work than the auditors must already perform. Moreover, the stan-
dard is far more precise than the identity of interest exception and 
therefore makes planning easier. Some uncertainty will always re-
main in the grey area, but reliance on GAAP leaves much less uncer-
tainty than the identity analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
Bankruptcy cases involving inter-affiliate transfers are inherently 
difficult. Some judges in complex bankruptcy proceedings have tried 
to correlate law with apparent equity by using an identity of interest 
exception to the fraudulent transfers doctrine. However, the excep-
tion is itself inequitable, allowing two affiliated corporations to be 
united for some purposes and distinct for others. In the interest of 
consistency and fairness, the courts should refrain from applying the 
identity of interest exception to allegedly fraudulent transfers. In-
stead, they should rely on the less troublesome concepts of novation 
and consolidation to achieve just results. 
